Elena Namli

Orthodox Theology and the Temptation of Power

Elena Namli - Professor of Ethics at the Faculty of Theology, Uppsala University; Research Director at the Uppsala Centre for Russian Studies (Uppsala, Sweden). elena.namli@ucrs.uu.se

The growing political and social role of the Russian Orthodox Church is one of the most challenging issues raised by recent developments in Russia. What do these developments represent? This article offers a critical analysis of the Russian Orthodox Church's involvement in Russian politics. Offering a theological perspective, the paper shows that the Russian Orthodox Church fails to make proper use of its own theological tools when it chooses to act as a partner of the state, rather than as an independent political agent. One of the most devastating consequences of this choice is that the Church provides a symbolic legitimation of widespread and growing nationalism. The analysis is focused upon the social doctrine of the Church and the official publications on the human rights. The texts of these documents are then related to some alternative theological positions within the Russian Orthodox tradition. It is argued that this tradition possesses theological resources to enrich the political life with constructive contribution, while eschewing the rhetoric of cultural exclusivism and nationalism.

Keywords: social ethics, moral theology, Russian Orthodox Church and politics, public reason, church and state.

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One of the features of Russia's modern development is the growing political and social role of the Russian Orthodox Church. After a relatively long period of existence in the shadow of a secular state, the Russian Orthodox Church is once again becoming a prominent factor in political life. Representatives of state authorities and church hierarchs appear together at various official events; the Patriarch makes comments on political topics; the Church defends its right and duty to serve as an authoritative source of moral judgments in society. What does this situation mean? How to evaluate it?

The current state of affairs can be viewed, interpreted and evaluated as an expression of the phenomenon that many researchers call the "return of religion". To use the term meaningfully is to understand it in contrast to the widespread expectation in the past that the political role of religion will decline as society modernizes and democratizes. On the contrary, we are now seeing an increasingly visible political presence of religion all over the world. This direction of development requires a serious study of how a democratic secular State and politics relate to religion.

Take for example John Rawls, who, as we know, excluded religion from the sphere of public reason. In his book Political Liberalism, published in 1993, Rawls argues that public reason (i.e., "the reason of equal citizens who collectively exercise decisive political and coercive power") is not the same as the public mind.1) does not include "reason"..."2. Along with other types of reason, religious reason is understood as non-public, and therefore, being applied to the exercise of democratic power, it must be transformed - "translated" into the language of secular, general civil thinking. Such an understanding of religion and religious reason presupposes the idea of liberal public reason as a formal judgment on the basic norms of social justice, without any connection with a meaningful vision of the moral ideal of "good society", human dignity, etc.

1. Rawls, J. (2005) Political Liberalism, p. 214. Expanded edition. NY: Columbia University Press.

2. Ibid., p. 213.

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Interestingly, Rawls cites the US Supreme Court as an example of such formal public reason, which, in his opinion, speaks in terms of the exercise of democratic power, and therefore of public reason:

Judges cannot, of course, rely on their own personal morals, nor on the ideas and virtues of morality in general. They should consider them irrelevant. Similarly, they cannot rely on their own or others ' religious or philosophical views. Nor can they refer to political values taken without any restrictions. Rather, they should appeal to the political values that they believe express the most reasonable understanding of the public and its inherent political values of justice and public reason.3
From my point of view, this example is evidence against Rawls. The practice of the Supreme Court clearly demonstrates that judges rely on ideas and moral views that are meaningfully related to different types of worldview. Ronald Dworkin, who in most cases follows the argument of Rawls ' liberalism and in whom Rawls sees a proponent of his own understanding of the nature and role of the Supreme Court, shows that the legal judgments of judges are associated with specific and highly meaningful moral and political beliefs. In order to make sense of the provisions of the Constitution, judges directly or indirectly refer to different types of moral arguments.4
I cannot here elaborate further on my criticisms of Rawls ' position in Political Liberalism. For the purposes of this article, the following is important: the notion that the public mind of a liberal democratic society can and should be independent of various "comprehensive doctrines" - worldviews-can be called into question, and, therefore, there is a need for other approaches to the relationship between public mind and religion. One of these approaches is suggested by Jurgen Habermas, who in recent years has seriously revised his own, previously very

3. Ibid., p. 236.

4. Dworkin, R. (1996) Freedom's Law. The Moral Reading of the American Constitution. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Dworkin, R. (2006) Justice in Robes. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

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close to Rawls views on religion and the political. In the later Habermas we find a more grounded understanding of the nature of the public mind. Like Rawls, Habermas defends the ideal of a secular state. But given the direction of the development of existing democracies and the growing political importance of religions, Habermas admits that religion can play an important political role. He argues that religion in today's global society often gives political engagement a moral motivation that is absent in traditional liberal ideology. Habermas also criticizes Rawls 'position in the part where she expresses a tendency to see the secular mind as something less contextual and "meaningful"than religion. 5
I share Jurgen Habermas ' view that religion can be a significant political force and encourage public activism, which is crucial for a viable democratic society. At the same time, it is necessary to carefully examine the conditions under which political activity of a religion is legitimate. One of the weak points in the discussion of this issue in Western science is the tendency to view these conditions as exclusively institutional (and primarily constitutional) restrictions imposed by society on religious individuals and groups.6 Such an understanding reduces religion to an object of politics, underestimates the political potential of religious groups, and unfairly discriminates against religious political activities in relation to non-religious ones. A more balanced approach would be to complement the discussion around constitutional restrictions on political activity by developing questions related to how religious traditions themselves understand political activity, and therefore look for criteria for the legitimacy of political engagement that are relevant to religious traditions. This task is not feasible at the generalized level of "religion", but requires a deep knowledge of specific religious contexts.

5. Habermas, J. (2008) "Prepolitical Foundations of the Constitutional State?", in Habermas, J.Between Naturalism and Religion, pp. 101 - 113. Cambridge: Polity Press.

6. This trend is largely due to the fact that the question of the relationship between religion and politics is considered as part of the doctrine of human rights.

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The purpose of this article is to discuss the legitimacy of political involvement of religious actors, taking a detailed look at the situation in Russia. If Rawls and Habermas focus on arguments that justify the participation of individuals in political discourse, then I will turn to the ethical criteria for legitimate political activity of the Church. In other words, my goal is to offer a critical analysis of the involvement of the Russian Orthodox Church in Russian politics. I will approach this issue from a theological point of view and show that the Russian Orthodox Church does not use its own theological potential when it acts not as an independent political force, but as a "non-ideological" partner of the state. One of the consequences of this line of behavior is the symbolic legitimization of crude forms of nationalism, which has become a distinctive feature of socio-political discourse in modern Russia. The peculiarity of the political rhetoric of the representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church is the rejection of Western models of political and theological culture. Such a denial makes sense, since it is connected with the colonial or cultural-colonial ambitions of the West. At the same time, the Russian Orthodox Church finds itself in a situation that is historically well-known in many religions, when discussion and development of the substantive aspects of its own position is replaced by an emotional and sometimes irrational defense of identity. This article aims to show that the Russian theological tradition has the resources to enrich the country's political life and resist Western colonialism without going to the extremes of primitive nationalist rhetoric.

Social concept of the Church

The processes taking place in modern Russia indicate that the Russian Orthodox Church has decided to link its identity with the image of an important partner of the Russian state. Both church hierarchs and state leaders emphasize that the Russian Orthodox Church plays an exceptional role in the Russian Federation. On the one hand, article 14 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation asserts the secular nature of the State and prohibits the introduction of a State religion. This principle is reproduced in article 4 of the Federal Law-

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on "Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations". On the other hand, the preamble to the law states that the legislator recognizes "the special role of Orthodoxy in the history of Russia, in the formation and development of its spirituality and culture"7.

The very fact that a legal document indicates the importance of certain moral and political principles for the proper interpretation of its articles is not unusual. Many recognized international human rights instruments seek to combine the protection of individual freedoms with the protection of collective security and the sovereignty of national States. But it is extremely important to find a stable balance between various principles, without neglecting any of them. The processes observed in Russia show a tendency to violate the principle of equal rights of individuals, when the state seeks to protect the "traditional religions of Russia".

The purpose of this article is not to analyze this trend based on the interests of society. I will focus on how the Russian Orthodox Church itself responds to the temptation to be recognized as a particularly important partner of the state, and what this response means from a theological point of view.

In my opinion, the Church has two ways. The first is to reject the" invitation " of the State and act as an independent political and cultural actor among other actors in society. The second is to accept the role of a partner of the Russian state and a symbolic marker of "Russian identity". The first option requires developing your own political platform, first of all, a well-thought-out socio-political doctrine, and, of course, a willingness to work in the field of politics. The second option is nothing new. It is well known in history and is sometimes described in terms of a kind of" symphony " between Church and state. In the articles by Kostyuk and Suslov published in this issue, the reader will find many historical examples of partnership between the state and the Church.

Currently, the trend towards close cooperation between the state and the Church is reflected in a document designed to guide the social and political activities of the Church, which was called "Fundamentals of the social Concept of Russian Orthodox Church".-

7. Federal Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations (125 FZ).

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It was adopted by the Council of Bishops in 2000. Let's take a closer look at this document.

Chapter I sets out the main theological propositions and states that " The Church is called to act in the world in the image of Christ, to bear witness to Him and His Kingdom." A second reference to the metaphor of the Kingdom of God is made where the document says::

The Christian's participation in it [in the life of the surrounding world] should be based on the understanding that the world, society, and the state are objects of God's love, because they are intended for transformation and purification on the basis of God-confessed love. A Christian must see the world and society in the light of its ultimate destiny, in the eschatological light of the Kingdom of God.

Here the document captures an extremely important eschatological point for Orthodox theology, namely, the idea that the Church simultaneously belongs to the fallen world and the coming Kingdom of God. In his Introduction to Orthodox Dogmatic Theology, Metropolitan Hilarion explains that in the Orthodox tradition, the Church is understood as the unity of the earthly Church and the heavenly Church. 8 The idea that the Church "already" belongs to the Kingdom of God is clearly present in the liturgical practice of the Russian Church. But what does this mean in terms of social ethics9 and politics? The history of theology shows that an eschatological perspective can inspire moral theology and promote criticism of authority. First of all, this is due to the fact that social injustice becomes more noticeable when it is opposed by Christian visions of the Kingdom of God. When Karl Barth criticized national socialism or when Catholic liberation theology criticizes capitalism, the ideal of the Kingdom of God is used as a radical model of social justice.

The critical social dimension of Christian eschatology has not been developed in the Fundamentals of the Social Concept. As Shtekl rightly points out in their articles in this issue

8. Hilarion (Alfeyev), Metropolitan. The Sacrament of Faith. Introduction to Orthodox Dogmatic Theology. Moscow: Brotherhood of St. Tikhon, 1996, pp. 108-112.

9. Social ethics is the theory of justice, the theory of a just society. Questions of private morality are left out of the brackets.

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and Breuning, the document mentions the possibility of civil disobedience if the state's policy grossly contradicts Christian beliefs. At the same time, it remains unclear exactly which beliefs have this kind of political significance. The eschatological perspective is mentioned but not disclosed in the document. The social and ethical potential of eschatology is not developed in modern Russian works on moral theology. I get the impression that eschatologically shaped social ethics today are almost completely replaced by questions of individual morality, which is constantly emphasized. For example, in the widely used textbook on moral theology written by Archimandrite Platon (Igumnov), there is no chapter on social ethics at all10. I tried to find any general theological reflections on Orthodox social ethics, but found nothing. There are various lists of principles and norms, mainly concerning individual behavior and private morality, which various authors point out as significant for Orthodox ethics; and there are many norms and prohibitions listed in works on Orthodox moral teaching. But at the same time, there is absolutely no general theoretical theological reflection on the meaning and content of social justice.

The "Fundamentals of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church" states that in order to fulfill its vocation, the Church must serve God and people, follow "the principles of Christian morality" and fulfill the work of human salvation (I. 1. 3). The document does not clarify the meaning of these moral principles and does not explain how the Church should reason when social challenges arise they contradict the doctrine of salvation. Let's look at the document and try to understand these principles and priorities.

Chapter II is entitled " The Church and the Nation." It states that " the Church unites the universal principle with the national one." Thus, the Church must find a modern approach to the well-known duality of the Christian faith. On the one hand, faith appeals to all of humanity; on the other hand, it exists in the world among different cultures and States.

10. Plato (Archimandrite). Orthodox Moral theology. Holy Trinity St. Sergius Lavra, 1994.

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Christian churches have different approaches to this duality, and these differences have both historical and theological explanations. While the doctrine of the Catholic Church emphasizes its universal character, which to a certain extent transcends national borders, Protestant churches usually emphasize the importance of their inherent national identity. How does the Russian Orthodox Church deal with the tension between its universal claims and belonging to a particular culture? Obviously, this tension is recognized, and the Foundations of the Social Concept attempts to combine both approaches. In my opinion, the document's peculiarity is that it downplays universalist claims and therefore does not give an unconditional rebuff to nationalist interpretations of the Russian Orthodox tradition. Below I will express my critical thoughts on religious nationalism. Now it is important to emphasize that the tendency to move away from universalism is more implicit than through direct theological arguments. For example, the document emphasizes that patriotism is an important part of church teaching and practice. The Church encourages Christians to love their homeland and affirms (II. 3):

The patriotism of an Orthodox Christian must be effective. It manifests itself in defending the fatherland from the enemy, working for the good of the fatherland, taking care of the organization of people's life, including by participating in the affairs of state administration. A Christian is called to preserve and develop the national culture and national identity.

Speaking about the limitations of national feeling, the document points out that "aggressive nationalism, xenophobia, national exclusivity, interethnic hostility" should be considered as sinful phenomena (II. 4). Thus, the Church seems to distinguish between non-aggressive, tolerant nationalism and such nationalism that is subject to moral and theological condemnation. But the document does not develop the concept of what such non-aggressive nationalism should be and what its theological criteria are.

Further, it is unclear what definition of "nation" the authors of the document have in mind. In section II. 3 states that "when a nation,

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civil or ethnic, is a fully or mostly monoconfessional Orthodox community, it can in some sense be perceived as a single community of faith-the Orthodox people." This formulation is ambiguous and therefore raises questions. You can read it as a simple description of the fact that many people really consider the Orthodox community and the (Russian) people to be identical. But it can also be understood as a normative justification for such an understanding of the relationship between Church and nation. Another ambiguity of the document is related to the use of the word "Orthodox" in the application of the Church, then to the cultural tradition. In most cases, the authors refer to the Church, but sometimes, especially when it comes to the importance of Orthodoxy for society, they rather mean Orthodox culture. I think that in a political context, the distinction between religion and culture is important. The Church can legitimately claim a certain representation of the interests and views of believers. It is doubtful that this legitimacy extends to non-believers who identify themselves with the Orthodox culture. For example, many Russian citizens who recognize Orthodox culture as an essential part of their identity do not consider the social teaching of the Church to be important or binding. Numerous opinion polls show that this is the case with the majority of respondents who call themselves Orthodox 11.

The confusion between Orthodoxy as a culture and as a Church is just one of the many ambiguities present in the document. If we turn to the part of it that deals with the state and the Church, we will find many contradictory statements and terms. The discussion of this topic begins with the statement of the cardinal theological idea that the state is "a necessary element of life in a world corrupted by sin "(III. 2). The document confirms: "The necessity of the state does not arise directly from God's will for the original Adam, but from the consequences of the fall and from the agreement of actions to limit the domination of sin in the world with His will." The difference between the Orthodox and Catholic visions of the state is clearly evident here. As is well known, Catholics-

11. Is Russian society ready for modernization? Analytical report. Moscow: Russian Academy of Sciences. Institute of Sociology, 2010, pp. 103-108.

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Classical theology teaches that the State is part of the natural order and has its religious foundation in the act of creation. In the words of Pope Leo XIII,

since no society can be held together without someone leading it and directing everyone to work hard for the common good, then every state must have a ruling power, and this power, no less than society itself, has nature as its source and, therefore, God as its Creator. It follows that all public authority must come from God.12
The natural law given by God in human reason and nature is further considered as the main foundation and at the same time the main limitation of the institution of the state, and this law is intended to determine the relationship between the Church and the state. Catholic teaching thus asserts that natural law is given by God; it is universal and rationally comprehensible. From a theological point of view, it opens up broad opportunities for independent political activity for the Church through rational moral and religious criticism of the state and state policy. Such criticism does not imply any revealed knowledge and-at least potentially-is understandable to anyone. At the same time, the teaching of the Catholic Church states that natural law does not contradict Christian revelation in general and the Bible in particular. This means that religious ethics, understood as revealed ethics, can be applied to politics. It is precisely such a universal and at the same time revealed ethics that can provide criteria for the political involvement of the Church and its relationship to the state.

We will return to the question of the different understanding of natural law and its role in social ethics. Now let's look at another tradition, which is significantly different from the Catholic one. How does Lutheran theology view the state? This tradition, which is theologically more pluralistic than the Catholic one, tends to see the State as part of a fallen world rather than a natural part of creation. This does not mean rejecting natural law, but, like the Orthodox tradition, Lutheranism emphasizes the need to

12. Immortale Dei. Encyclical of Pope Leo XIII on the Christian Constitution of States. §3.

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consider the world (and people) deeply damaged by sin. In a very valuable book by the Swedish scholar Nils Ehrenstrom on the Christian faith and the state, first published in 1937, it is stated that the Lutheran tradition implies "the recognition of the fact that the world is 'possessed' by the devil, which makes supreme and unshakable authority and strict loyalty to this authority a necessary guarantee against social self-destruction. "13 Ehrenstrom continues, "Lutheran thinkers consider power and law to be constitutive elements of political power, which has the power of coercion as an integral element that logically follows from them." 14
Ehrenstrom rightly criticizes Lutheran theology for its theological justification of political power, relying on the very fact of having power as the basis of legitimacy. He clearly sees the dangers of this approach, especially when combined with his current tendency to "interpret the state in terms of the national community (Volksgemeinschaft)" Criticism of the Lutheran tradition does not mean that Ehrenstrom suggests a return to the Catholic theology of natural law. Rather, it looks for unclaimed resources in Protestant theology itself.

I agree with Ehrenstrom that rejecting the Catholic version of natural law as an important part of the Christian view of the state does not mean the end of the theological discourse on social and political justice. Within the Lutheran tradition, there are a number of fruitful approaches to the vision of legitimate political activity of the Christian Church. One of these approaches is an attempt to use the Gospel to create a theological theory of social justice. As some Lutheran theologians have shown, it is possible to modify the universalism and rationalism of natural law through such central gospel ideas as, for example, the ideal of selfless love. This theological ethic is a challenge to Luther's own teaching-

13. Ehrenstrom, N. (1937) Christian Faith and the Modern State, p. 163. London: Student Christian Movement Press.

14. Ibid., p. 163.

15. Ibid., p. 167.

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ra is about two kingdoms 16 and claims that the Church can and should be critical of (state) authority 17. The authors of the Foundations of the Social Concept are obviously aware of the diversity of meaningful theological approaches to the question of Church-State relations and explicitly mention the various strategies used by other Christian churches. But none of these strategies are considered appropriate for the Russian Orthodox Church. Osnovy Sotsial'noy Kontseptsii (Fundamentals of the Social Concept) argues that the theological roots of the Russian tradition should be sought in Byzantium, and even while recognizing that the state is an element of the fallen world, it calls for a symphonic relationship between the state and the Church. But how to fit this tradition into the realities of modern politics and legislation? In section III. 3 of the document states that " the state is usually secular and does not bind itself to any religious obligations. Its cooperation with the Church is limited to a number of areas and is based on mutual non-interference in each other's affairs." This could be interpreted as a viable model of Church-State relations, in which both partners recognize different and clearly defined roles. However, the document goes on to be inconsistent and provides a new description of the ideal of symphonic relations between the state and the Church. In section III. 4 we read that there is an "Orthodox state", and this kind of state is connected with the ideal of the symphony:

In the Orthodox tradition, a certain idea has been formed about the ideal form of relations between the Church and the state. Since church-state relations are a two-way phenomenon, the above-mentioned ideal form could historically have been developed only in a state that recognizes the Orthodox Church as the greatest national shrine - in other words, in an Orthodox state.

16. As you know, Luther himself considered the ethics of the gospel inapplicable in the political sphere. Luther's ethics of sacrificial love are limited to religion (salvation) and personal relationships.

17. See, for example, Grenholm, C. (1993) Protestant Work Ethics. A Study of Work Ethical Theories in Contemporary Protestant Theology, pp. 265 - 267. Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis.

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The document states that such relations are ideal and cannot be practiced by any Orthodox Churches in any circumstances. For example, the legal status of the Church before the October Revolution is described as a combination of the legacy of the symphonic tradition with the status of a state religion in the Protestant world. The document does not clarify the extent to which the Church in modern Russia accepts the symphony's ideal. On the one hand, the document states that the state and the Church have different natures and functions, and confirms the state's observance of"religious and ideological neutrality". On the other hand, the Church regrets the recent adoption of the principle of freedom of conscience, which, according to the authors of the document, "turns the state into an exclusively earthly institution that does not bind itself to religious obligations" (III. 6). My reading of the chapter on the relationship between Church and state leads me to the conclusion that this document is in fact a religious document. It interprets the principle of secularism of the state and claims that the Russian Orthodox Church has special obligations towards Russian statehood. The document states (III. 6):

The religious and ideological neutrality of the state does not contradict the Christian idea of the Church's vocation in society. However, the Church should point out to the State that it is unacceptable to spread beliefs or actions that lead to the establishment of complete control over the life of the individual [ ... ] as well as to the destruction of personal, family or public morals, insult religious feelings, damage the cultural and spiritual identity of the people or threaten the sacred gift of life.

The document goes on to indicate at least sixteen different areas of cooperation with the State that are acceptable to the Church. Among them are "care for the preservation of morality in society"; "spiritual, cultural, moral and patriotic education and upbringing"; "care for soldiers and law enforcement officers, their spiritual and moral education"; "countering the activities of pseudo-religious structures that pose a danger to the individual and society." Excluded areas include: political struggle, civil war, etc.-

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Zhdanskaya or aggressive foreign war and "direct participation" in intelligence activities. It is important and highly problematic that this expanded cooperation is limited only to issues of individual morality and private behavior, abstracting from the norms of social justice.

The Russian Orthodox Church seeks to find justifications for close cooperation with the state both in the legislation of the Russian Federation and in its own theology. The ongoing processes show that cooperation between the State authorities and the Moscow Patriarchate is becoming closer; it seems that although the Russian Orthodox Church has an ecclesiology very similar to the universalist ecclesiology of the Catholic Church, it is attracted by the traditional Lutheran ideal of theology of the State Church. On the one hand, the "nationalization" and bureaucratization of the Church carried out by Peter the Great is considered a sad fact in the history of the Orthodox Church, and on the other hand, its self-understanding still includes the ideal of a state religion.

But even more interesting and requires serious political and theological analysis is the fact that the Church seeks closer cooperation with the state, without revealing any political ambitions on its part. In chapter V of the Fundamentals of the Social Concept, the authors state that the Church refrains from political struggle, and also distances itself from any ideological and political programs. Representatives of the Church are forbidden to join political parties, and ordinary members of the Church can engage in political activity only if they do not draw any connection between their political activity and the Orthodox faith. The Church imposes a moral restriction on the political activities of its members in the following wording::

In the face of political differences, contradictions, and struggles, the Church preaches peace and cooperation among people who hold different political views. It also allows the existence of various political beliefs among its episcopate, clergy and laity, with the exception of those that clearly lead to actions contrary to the Orthodox faith and the moral norms of church Tradition.

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Here we find two ideas that deserve more thoughtful consideration. The first is the already mentioned idea of non-political cooperation between the Church and the state, and the second is the idea that within the Orthodox Tradition there are some fundamental norms of individual morality that should be used as tools of criticism in the public sphere. The current trend of understanding the content of Tradition as unchangeable, independent of social development, causes (or strengthens)the following factors: moral conservatism of the Church. Moral norms are considered as immutable, once and for all given. I will try to show that both ideas-non-political cooperation with the state and the belief in the immutability of individual moral norms-are questionable in themselves, and when taken together, they are highly vulnerable to political abuse.

Social ethics and legitimate political activity

What are the difficulties associated with the ideal of non-political cooperation between the state and the Church? One difficulty that is often present both in the Church's documents and in its practice is the risk of a hidden political agenda. Such an agenda is not necessarily understood, but it can nevertheless serve certain political interests. This is true for any attempt to work in the political sphere without having a transparent ideological platform. Another danger is more specifically related to the political activity of the Church: it is the risk of becoming an important legitimizing factor in relation to power as such. Of course, it is possible to consciously choose such an approach and argue that the Church, to which the majority of the population belongs, should support any current state authority. On the other hand, both historical experience and theological reflection strongly oppose this position. One tragic but not unique example in the twentieth century is the" non-political " support of the Nazi regime by many Christian churches in Europe.

As a representative of the Russian majority of the Russian Federation, the Russian Orthodox Church is susceptible to the temptation of power (or proximity to it), it can perform-and very often-

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sto fulfills - an order for the symbolic legitimation of power as such. By accepting the role of an "apolitical" partner of the state, the Church in practice reduces its function in the political sphere to the protection of the existing state. The importance of this function cannot be denied, but it still requires both political and socio-ethical constraints. Responsible political activity in the modern world presupposes either a clear political program or a clearly formulated social ethic, which is used when analyzing various political alternatives and labeling some of them as unacceptable. How, for example, can we dissociate ourselves from aggressive nationalism? How can we support the development of statehood without bowing to the authorities? The "Foundations of the Social Concept" addresses these fundamental topics, but restricts itself by refraining from clearly articulating the principles of political and social morality.

At present, the Church clearly focuses on issues of private, primarily sexual, morality and personal patriotism. I think that this orientation does not give the Church a legitimate platform for political activity. A serious problem is that this conservative and reductionist view of morality indirectly links the Church to extreme nationalist and racist groups, which very often include conservative sexual morality in their programs and advocate a traditional view of the role of women. The Russian Church declares its commitment to the values of the traditional family and presents this as an important (most important) social issue 18. It seems to me that for modern Russia, the scope of political pragmatism and even cynicism is much more dangerous than the alleged deviations from traditional family values. Pragmatism and cynicism in Russia's political life prevent the formation of democracy and civil society, while at the same time leaving wide scope for aggressive nationalistic emotions. These emotions are now becoming the main ideological motivation in the political space and are used by various political forces, including the state.

18. In many educational texts, Internet sites, and mass media, representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church emphasize that the traditional family and "traditional values" are fundamentally important for the survival and development of Russian society.

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Both the historical experience of the Russian Church itself and the example of the tragic popularity of Deutsche Christen19 at the time of Hitler's rise to power in Germany indicate the risks associated with the rejection of a clear socio-political doctrine of the Church. Such a doctrine cannot be reduced to eclectic lists of" traditional values " of private morality, which obviously attract the modern leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church. In her article in this issue, Kristina Steckl demonstrates how the Russian Orthodox Church transforms the concept of human rights, limiting it to the framework of moral conservatism. Nevertheless, it seems to me, as other articles in this issue show, that Russian Orthodoxy has the opportunity to formulate theologically sound and politically acceptable basic principles of social morality.

But is it really possible to create an Orthodox social doctrine, an Orthodox theology of justice? Their absence may indicate that, in addition to historical and political reasons, there are some internal theological obstacles that prevent the formation of a consistent socio-ethical model in the Russian Orthodox tradition. I think we should take this hypothesis very seriously. If the theological tradition restricts itself to moral conservatism in the sphere of private morality, it is difficult to justify the legitimacy of the Russian Orthodox Church's political involvement.20 But first you should test this hypothesis-analyze the opportunities for development.-

19. German Christians (German: Deutsche Christen) - a movement organized in May 1932 by supporters of national socialism among the German clergy of the Evangelical Church of Germany. - Note. perev.

20. My argument involves a very specific understanding of the political. Politics, in my interpretation, presupposes the possibility of institutional social justice and is not reduced to the cynicism of real politics, nor to the simple prerequisites of human life. Many Christian theologians of various traditions view politics as an exclusively external prerequisite for personal salvation, achieved in personal relationships, and not in the political sphere. In this approach, the question of social justice is practically eliminated from the theological discourse on politics, and theologians refuse to discuss the preference of certain institutional forms. Such a position in practice often leads to uncritical support of government structures. The political conservatism of St. Augustine and Luther is the most famous example of this.

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incapable Orthodox social ethics and political theology 21.

In my opinion, there are resources within Orthodox theology that can be used to develop a consistent social ethic and thus counteract the current tendency to once again turn the Russian Orthodox Church into an obedient servant of the Russian State and a means of symbolically legitimizing Russian nationalism. One such resource is the theological critique of power. This criticism has been carried out in various forms throughout the history of the Russian Orthodox Church. Here are just a few relatively recent examples. These examples are far from systematic, and my goal so far is only to start a discussion about political and theological resources in the Russian tradition.22
Among those who made a significant contribution to the Russian tradition of theological criticism of power is the famous ethicist and philosopher Boris Vysheslavtsev (1877-1954). In one of his works, entitled "The Problem of Power", he opposes utilitarianism and argues that from a theological point of view, no power should be considered a neutral tool for achieving normative goals. According to Vysheslavtsev, any government is "fundamentally sinful" 23. Power is always associated with coercion and therefore opposes true freedom. This is true even for legitimate forms of government, such as institutional "protection of legal freedom"24. It is therefore a mistake to think of any earthly power as comparable to the Kingdom of God. Vysheslavtsev means that the Kingdom of God is the kingdom of freedom, and " coercion has no place in the Kingdom of God." Of course, it is possible and necessary to distinguish between legal and illegal possession of-

21. By the latter I mean precisely the theology of politics, not the conservative theory of Karl Schmitt.

22. Konstantin Kostyuk's relatively recently published book is the first serious systematic presentation of the social theology of the Russian Orthodox Church. However, the author confines himself to systematization and does not conduct a theological critical analysis of social ethics in Orthodoxy. See K. Kostyuk. History of social and ethical thought in the Russian Orthodox Church. Saint Petersburg: Aletheia Publ., 2013.

23. Vysheslavtsev B. Problema vlasti [The problem of power] // Vysheslavtsev B. Ethics of the transfigured Eros. Moscow: Respublika, 1994. p. 204. 24. Ibid., p. 212.

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It is also important to understand that the highest good does not "take the form of power" 25. This is true because the highest values of Christianity are not victory and domination, but freedom and love.

Vysheslavtsev uses the term "dialectic of evaluation" and argues that Christian ethics combines the Old Testament dialectic, that is, "the ability to understand and discern the insignificant in what dominates and triumphs", with the dialectic of the New Testament, which implies "the ability to evaluate the sublime, even if it is humiliated" 26. According to Vysheslavtsev, Christian ethics sets a basic norm that is the opposite of the ideal of power. This ideal states that "winners are not judged," whereas Christian ethics promises that winners will be brought to justice. Vysheslavtsev uses the Russian idiomatic expression "winners are not judged" to reverse it and present it as an eschatological promise of the Last Judgment (over the winners). It is important to emphasize that, according to Vysheslavtsev, this eschatological dimension can and should be used as a critical tool in social life. I have already said that the social doctrine of the Russian Church presented in the Fundamentals of the Social Concept includes an eschatological dimension, but does not develop it. Vysheslavtsev shows quite clearly how Christian eschatology makes all worldly power relative by referring to the Kingdom of God as the kingdom of love and righteousness.

It is also important that Vysheslavtsev quite deliberately belittles the ideal of divine omnipotence and asserts that God's authority is based solely on love and freedom. A similar, clearly Christological critique of the phenomenon of power is also contained in the legacy of Mikhail Bakhtin (1895-1975). The Christian God, in Bakhtin's thinking , is a God who renounces all power in order to place his destiny in the hands of a free man. Among other things, this is manifested in the fact that it was left to man to recognize his God or to crucify Him. 27 It is obvious that Bakhtin, like, for example, Nikolai Berdyaev (1874-1948) and some other Russian philosophers and theologians, was

25. Ibid., p. 212.

26. Ibid., p. 227.

27. Bakhtin M. Author and hero in aesthetic activity" / / Bakhtin M. Collected works. Vol. 1. Moscow: russkie slovari Publishing House, 2003, pp. 132-134.

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under the deep influence of Fyodor Dostoevsky, with his radical Christology and criticism of the church striving for power. In a well-known and frequently quoted passage from The Brothers Karamazov, the inquisitor, who, in my interpretation, represents the desire of all Christian churches for power and control, says to Christ himself::

Instead of a firm ancient law-a free heart should henceforth decide for himself what is good and what is evil, having only your image before him as a guide - but did you not think that he would finally reject and challenge even your image and your truth, if he was oppressed by such a terrible burden as this? freedom of choice?28

I would argue that in modern Russia, as in the rest of the world today, the further development of the Christological critique of power can play an important political role. Through this critique, various forms of power can be called into question. This critique has an important critical potential; it reveals the most diverse forms of domination and coercion-these internal elements of power as such.

At the same time, it is obvious that this kind of criticism is not sufficient if we are looking for a theological ethic that can justify the specific political activity of the Christian church. The weakness of criticism of power by Vysheslavtsev, Bakhtin, and some other Russian Christian philosophers and theologians is that they tend to ignore the distinction between legitimate and illegal use of power and focus on the sinfulness of power itself. Therefore, in order to create a viable theology of political participation, it is absolutely necessary to develop the principles of social morality in the ethically traditional sense, that is, by means of normative theory. This theory aims at a clearly articulated set of criteria to distinguish between right and wrong actions, legitimate and illegal authority, and so on. But in the Russian theological tradition (as, indeed, in philosophical ethics), there is clearly no interest in normative ethical theory.

28. Dostoevsky F. The Brothers Karamazov// Dostoevsky F. Complete works. Volume 14. Leningrad: Nauka Publ., 1976, p. 232.

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It is not the purpose of this article to develop such a theory or to prove that there is a normative theory that is compatible with the Russian Orthodox tradition. My goal is to show that the social program of the Church, as presented in the Fundamentals of the Social Concept and in church practice, does not fulfill its function, since in search of a legitimate social and political role for Orthodoxy, it focuses on issues of private morality. On the one hand, the Church condemns the individualism of traditions such as political liberalism and human rights, but on the other hand, it does not seek an alternative model of social justice, focusing on issues of behavior in the private or even intimate sphere. This is due not only to the pragmatism of the church leadership in the short term, but also to the lack of a tradition of self-critical theological reflection around social ethics. Nevertheless, I think that in the near future Russian Orthodox thought will develop theological approaches with the aim of creating a consistent social ethic, or set of norms, including principles for their application, that can inspire the political activity of the Church and at the same time limit it.

One of the candidates for the role of such a normative principle is, in my opinion, Christian humanism. When the Russian Orthodox Church was looking for a new role in society in the late 1980s, many hoped that it would be associated with a form of Christian humanism. This hope was clearly expressed by Alexander Men (1935-1990), one of the most famous and respected Orthodox theologians of that time. He argued that the absolute value of the human person is the very essence of Christian proclamation.29 Accordingly, Alexander Men believed that humanistic Christian theology should develop in dialogue with society, culture and science. The recognition of certain specific conventional norms adopted by the Church Fathers centuries ago as the unchangeable basis of the Orthodox tradition does not always indicate loyalty to the Christian message. In this respect, Alexander Men followed one of the most prominent Russian theologians of the twentieth century, Professor Georgy Florovsky (1893-1979), who repeatedly criticized theologians who saw fidelity to Tradition as a way "back,

29. Men A. Kul'tura i dukhovnoe voskhodstvo [Culture and spiritual ascent]. Moscow: Iskusstvo Publ., 1992, p. 21.

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to the Fathers." Florovsky emphasized that development should go "forward, to the Fathers." The challenge is to understand the religious and moral implications of their heritage, not to collect their disparate opinions on specific issues. 30 Alexander Men urged his readers not to be afraid of creative and critical thinking in theology.31 What is important here is that Meng recognized the role of humanism as crucial in the social sphere and politics. He tried to show that "Christianity considers the separation of Church and state to be the optimal situation for faith and sees danger in the very idea of a state religion"32. Alexander Men concludes his reflections on the relationship between Christianity and the political sphere with the statement:"The value of any system is measured by what it gives to a person: expediency and humanity." 33 My Christian humanism was based on the legacy of such Orthodox theologians as Nikolai Berdyaev and Sergiy Bulgakov (1871-1944). At that time, it seemed that the Church was able to build a vital and effective theological ethic based on the ideas of Christian humanism. Today, speaking on the issue of Christian humanism, Metropolitan Hilarion admits that it is much less developed in Orthodoxy than in Catholic theology. But the Metropolitan does not consider it timely to develop an Orthodox form of Christian humanism. Rather, he believes that Christianity as such is inherently humane, with Orthodoxy being "more humane than secular humanism." 34 This statement can be questioned on both theological and historical grounds. We know that Christian theology can develop, and often did, as a critique of humanism or even a rejection of it. Consequently, Christian theologians must either distance themselves from humanism or adhere to its norms when formulating the social ethics of the Church. From this point of view, the analysis of the discussion about the concepts of human value and dignity, which is carried out by Breuning in this issue, is very revealing. In a kind of "correspondence controversy" with Kristina

30. Florovsky G. Puti Russkogo bogosloviya [Ways of Russian theology]. Vilnius, 1991. p. 506.

31. Men A. Kul'tura i dukhovnoe voskhodstvo [Culture and spiritual ascent]. Moscow: Iskusstvo Publ., 1992, p. 28.

32. Ibid., p. 28.

33. Ibid., p. 30.

34. Hilarion (Alfeyev), Metropolitan. The Sacrament of Faith. p. 309.

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Stekl, who in her article denies the productivity of the concept of value and calls for limiting oneself to the traditional concept of human dignity, Breuning shows the possibilities that may be hidden in the theological division of value and dignity, which is held in a number of documents of the Russian Orthodox Church. One of them is the search for such forms of humanism - a worldview that asserts the irremediable value of the human person-that do not infantilize the person and do not remove from it responsibility both to the Creator and to the creation.

Other potential tools for building Orthodox social ethics include the concept of natural law. The doctrine of natural law, with its characteristic belief in the universal ability of the human mind to distinguish between right and wrong, is recognized as part of Orthodox tradition, 35 but is rarely involved in modern theological discussions of social morality. It makes sense to mention that many Russian philosophers and theologians have taken and still do take a critical position regarding the rationalism inherent in the tradition of natural law. This critique is valuable and rightly reveals some of the limitations inherent in rationalism. But it should not prevent attempts to apply the tradition of natural law or some of its elements to the field of social ethics, where it is the rationalism and universalism of natural law that are effective tools for productive social analysis. The claim that" Christians do not need to resort to the natural moral law, having a higher and more perfect ethics in the Gospel", put forward, for example, by the professor of moral theology Plato36, does not stand up to serious theological criticism. First, as already noted, natural law is recognized as part of Orthodox Tradition. Second, there is no such thing as a unified gospel ethic. The moral content of the Gospel is always the result of interpretation, and rational thinking is one of the most reliable tools for any interpretation. So I think it makes sense to try to work on how you can do this. -

35. Plato (Archimandrite). Orthodox Moral theology. Holy Trinity St. Sergius Lavra, 1994, p. 38.

36. Ibid., p. 43.

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but it would be better to use elements of the doctrine of natural law in the moral theology of the Orthodox Church. In an interview with K. M. Antonov, published in this issue, a number of examples of constructive use of the tradition of natural law in the works of Russian Orthodox thinkers of the XIX and early XX centuries are given.

Towards a Universalist Orthodox Social Ethic

I am aware that a serious argument against my position is that both humanism and natural law belong to the Western tradition and are being used politically to present certain sets of contextual Western values as universally valid and superior to other traditions. I agree with Russian and Western critics who point out the obviously colonial nature of the universalist claim of natural law with its rationalistic character. Gianni Vattimo, one of those European philosophers who today seek an alternative to Western rationalism, linking it to the tradition of natural law, uses the term "violent reason"to describe this phenomenon. When a certain norm is declared natural (and therefore universal and compulsively rational), it means prohibiting the potential questioning of this norm by another tradition or norm. Vattimo claims that "violence is a fact of shutting down, silencing, stopping the dialogue of questions and answers"37. He believes that there is a connection between rationalism, violence, and what he describes as "the metaphysics of the last foundation." Vattimo defines this metaphysics "as the forcible imposition of an order that is declared objective and natural and therefore cannot be violated, is no longer the subject of discussion." 38
However, to listen to this kind of criticism and learn from it does not necessarily mean rejecting the very possibility of a rational normative theory. This also does not prove the lack of constructive potential of rationalistic ethics.

37. Vattimo, G. (2007) "A Prayer for Silence", in Caputo, J. D. and Vattimo, G. After the Death of God, p. 93. N.Y.: Columbia University Press.

38. Ibid.

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Vattimo himself does not advocate irrationalism or moral relativism. He offers a kind of interpretive (hermeneutical) mind as an alternative to the mind of natural law, describing this mind as nonviolent and responsible in relation to one's own cultural heritage. Speaking about the significance of traditional values, Vattimo explains::

If we consider these rules in their true form-not as nature or essence, but as cultural heritage-they can still be significant for us, but having become immutable in a new way: as rational norms (recognized through discourse, logos, reason; through the reconstruction of the way they originated), released from the violent nature inherent in the first principles (and those authorities who feel responsible for them). Whether or not these norms retain their validity must be decided in the light of the criterion that, together with its responsible interpretation, we consider to apply to everything that "really" forms part of the heritage that we perceive as our own.

One possibility is to follow Vattimo and develop a more hermeneutical approach to practical rationality. There are, of course, other models. In any case, it would be a mistake to refer to the colonial nature of universalist projects in order to justify the exclusivity of one's own position. This is what often happens in Russia. Representatives of the Church uncritically and without proof declare various foreign traditions incompatible with Orthodoxy. Most often, liberalism is called an "alien and non-Orthodox" tradition. Today, hostility to liberalism is growing stronger in the Russian Orthodox Church and is combined with hostility to those Protestant churches that incorporate liberal values into their social policies.40
This phenomenon is not new. Even in the legacy of Fyodor Dostoevsky, there is a desire to combine the Orthodox Christianity of the "Russian people" with a total rejection of liberal freedom.-

39. Vattimo, G. (2004) Nihilism and Emancipation. Ethics, Politics, and Law, p. 46. N. Y.: Columbia University Press.

40. Hilarion (Alfeyev), Metropolitan. The Sacrament of Faith. p. 127.

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bodas as a foreign tradition. In another context, I have already mentioned that Dostoevsky's critique of "Western rationalism" contains philosophically and theologically valuable observations.41 But no less important, Dostoevsky shows a dangerous tendency to uncritically reject liberalism, which is combined with a very dubious justification of primitive nationalistic emotions. Already in Winter Notes on Summer Impressions (1863) Dostoevsky turns to criticism of liberal freedoms in order to emphasize the uniqueness and superiority of the Orthodox culture of the Russian people. Rightly criticizing the individualism and consumerism of European capitalist society, he polemically and unreasonably uses criticism to demonstrate the cultural contrast between European individualism and the capacity of the Russian people for solidarity and self-sacrifice.42 In Dostoevsky's last novel, The Brothers Karamazov (1881), the critique of liberal values is equally ambiguous. On the one hand, Dostoevsky most emphatically and rightly criticizes the liberal ideal of freedom as a rejection of responsibility for the other; on the other hand, this criticism often degenerates into a nationalistic admiration for everything Russian. Westernized liberal doctors and lawyers, Poles and Jews are described in The Brothers Karamazov as alien to any solidarity with suffering people (and animals).

It is not difficult to read a great novel in spite of Dostoevsky's own nationalism. But it is also important to be aware of its nationalistic dimension, which largely consists in transforming a truly moral conflict into an identity discourse. Tragically, history seems to be repeating itself. Instead of developing a clearly formulated social ethic that can respond to the problems of society, the Russian Church builds its political activities in terms of identity, distancing itself from other traditions, and above all from European liberalism. Instead of looking for theologically acceptable criteria for social norms, the Church defends the normative priority of its "traditional norms".

41. Namli, E. (2009) Catr med fornuftet. Rysk kritik au uasterlandsk rationalism, pp. 253 - 260. Skelleftea: Artos.

42. Dostoevsky F. Winter notes on summer impressions// Dostoevsky F. Complete works. Volume 5. Leningrad: Nauka Publ., 1973, pp. 78-82.

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The potential weakness of this strategy is obvious. There are many norms that claim or can claim to be traditional. To distinguish between still relevant norms and outdated ones, and to resolve conflicts between norms that are significant in themselves, we need criteria. In the absence of clear and rational criteria, the possession of power (in this case in the Church) tends to become the only criterion. The temptation to power is not limited to material goods; it also extends to the possibility of declaring one's own judgment binding. At this point, any political figure is vulnerable and ultimately responsible to society. The Russian Church is no exception, unless, of course, it is ready to abandon politics and limit its activities to liturgical practice.

In modern conditions, there is no other way to avoid what I call the "temptation of power" than to engage in a dialogue with society. To do this, the Church needs to further develop a social doctrine based on clearly defined principles. Such principles will allow each person to assess the position of the Church. At the beginning of this article, it was stated that the Russian Orthodox tradition combines a universalist approach with a strong attachment to Russian culture and statehood. In the current situation, it is extremely important to rely on the universalism of tradition. This universalism is not limited to the" universalism " of Dostoevsky, who believed that the Russian people already possessed universal truth. The universalism of tradition rather means what I call "open universalism." Such universalism works as a tool for deconstructing any particular norm that claims to be universal. He opposes relativism, because he seeks values that cannot be justified solely by reference to tradition. On the other hand, he warns us against claiming that we already have universal norms, and constantly draws our attention to the arguments of the "other side".

Open universalism cannot lead to a stable set of immutable concrete norms. He calls for social justice, but this justice reveals the facts of injustice rather than determines the "right order". Therefore, such universalism can become an effective tool for social criticism of any political activity. It is important to note that the open universality of critical social

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The teachings do not threaten traditional liturgical practice, if only because the Orthodox Liturgy is celebrated in the Church Slavonic language, and it practically does not include statements that would be recognized today as social and ethical norms. Open universalism in the understanding of social ethics as the basis of political involvement can be brought into line with the peculiarity of the Russian Orthodox tradition. This tradition is not limited to a single text, nor to a single theologian whose statements could be considered binding in the field of social ethics. Therefore, it is possible to develop a teaching based on several central principles and give them different interpretations based on rational and critical discussions. In fact, the Church could serve as an even better support for a stable Russian statehood if it abandoned nationalist rhetoric and began to work on the social problems of Russian society, without experiencing an irrational fear of being in colonial dependence on foreign culture. As George Florovsky once said, Russian theology can offer its own answers, but it cannot ignore the questions posed by the European tradition.43
Translated from English by Galina Vdovina

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